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Abstract— Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as 
it is now evident from observations of increases in global 
average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of 
snow and ice and rising global average sea level. 
Observational evidence from all continents and most oceans 
shows that many natural systems are being affected by 
regional climate changes, particularly temperature 
increases. Other effects of regional climate changes on 
natural and human environments are emerging, although 
many are difficult to discern due to adaptation and non-
climatic drivers. Most of the observed increase in global 
average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very 
likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases concentrations. In this framework, sea 
level rise is virtually certain and increasing frequency of 
heat waves and heavy precipitation events is very likely 
during the 21st century. This will impact ecosystems, food 
security, coastal areas, human health, water availability, 
and economies. 
Since current (2000-2010) CO2 emissions are near the 
worst Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
scenario (A1F1) projecting a global average surface 
warming of 2.4 to 6.4°C and a sea level rise of 26 to 59 cm 
(excluding any future rapid dynamical change in ice flow) at 
2090-2099 relative to 1990-1999. And since it is very likely 
that the international response will be very weak in the near 
future (as it has been in the past), giving no chance to a 
second phase to the Kyoto Protocol that expires in 2012. We 
thus have to accept that climate change mitigation is behind 
us and that only adaptation to global warming is the 
response to reduce vulnerability of natural and human 
systems to climate change effects. However, we know that in 
the absence of climate change effects, the vulnerability of 
natural and human systems is extremely high, especially due 
to the mismanagement of natural resources, the lack of land 
use planning and the nonexistence of policies focused on 
natural hazard management. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We live in a constantly changing world characterized by 
an improved knowledge of past, current and future trends of 
several indicators. We now have a better understanding of 
how these global numbers will interact and what will be their 
impacts on environment, economy, trade, international 
stability, food security, etc. 
In recent years, the world population has dramatically 
increased, rising from 3.7 billion in 1971 to 7.0 billion 
currently (2011) and is projected to reach 9.1 billion by 
2050. Forty years ago, 64% of the population was living in 
rural areas. This proportion fell to 50% today and will 
decline to 30% by 2050 [1]. So the structure of the 
population changes, not only in absolute number but also in 
its way of life. In the same time, energy needs intensify in a 
globalising world. Yet, from 5,500 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (Mtoe) in 1971, the world primary energy demand 
increased up to 12,300 Mtoe in 2008, which represents a 
26% increase in energy demand per capita in near four 
decades. With a major problem: fossil fuels (oil, coal and 
gas) are the dominant energy sources (82%) and their 
proportion in the global energy offer should remain 
unchanged by 2035 [2-4]. Although this allows an 
unprecedented human development in history, the question is 
to know if this development is sustainable with regards to the 
erosion of biodiversity, forests resources decline, advancing 
desertification or climate change. 
The past decade has seen an impressive rise in public 
awareness of the importance of climate change [5-7] which 
has become a major issue in corporate, national and global 
policies. Year after year, large scientific conferences and 
political negotiations take place all over the world. If the 
recent scientific understanding of climate change has 
improved remarkably [8], a spectacular shift in the political 
process is still awaited [9-10] and before the next Conference 
of the Parties (COP 17) of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Durban, 
South Africa, by the end of 2011, there is no sign from any 
major greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters of a concrete proposal 
to establish a legally binding international agreement in 
significant GHG reductions for the post-Kyoto Protocol 
period (2008-2012). 
This paper briefly reviews the current state of knowledge 
on climate change, presents why no global dramatic shift in 
the political process is reach, and demonstrates that –in the 
absence of climate change effects– the vulnerability of the 
natural and human systems is extremely high. 
II. CAUSES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
The radiative forcing of the climate system is dominated 
by the long-lived GHGs, and this section considers those 
whose emissions are covered by the UNFCCC. 
Global GHG emissions due to human activities have 
grown since pre-industrial times. Global atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2, CH4 and N2O (the three major GHGs) 
have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 
1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values determined 
from ice cores spanning many thousands of years (Fig. 1). 
The atmospheric concentrations of CO2 (390 ppm in 2010) 
[11-12] exceed by far the natural range over the last 800,000 
years [10,13]. Global increases in CO2 concentrations are 
due primarily to fossil fuel (coal, oil and gas) use, with land-
use change (deforestation, decay of biomass, etc) providing 
another significant but smaller contribution. CO2 represents 
76.7% of the anthropogenic GHG, out of which 59.4% are 
due to fossil fuel combustion and 17.3% due to land-use 
change. The analysis of the recent anthropogenic global 
carbon dioxide budget is extremely interesting. 
Recent increase in atmospheric CO2 is driven by fossil 
fuel burning since 7.7 GtC/y were emitted during the 2000-
2009 period compared to the 6.4 GtC/y recorded during the 
1990s. This increase is extremely important in just a decade. 
In 2009, 8.4 GtC/y were released into the atmosphere despite 
the global financial and economic crisis that started in 2008. 
In addition, land-use change contributed to 1.1 GtC/y in the 
2000s. These 8.8 GtC/y released are largely sufficient to 
exceed the balancing effect of natural sinks: land (2.4 GtC/y) 
and oceans (2.3 GtC/y). As a result, 47% of the CO2 released 
remains into the atmosphere [11,14]. 
It is very likely 1  that the observed increase in CH4 
concentration (14.3% of the GHG) is predominantly due to 
agriculture, fossil fuel use and animal husbandry. The 
increase in N2O concentration (7.9% of the GHG) is 
primarily due to agriculture (soil and animal manure 
management) although important contributions also come 
from sewage treatment, combustion of fossil fuel, and 
chemical industrial processes. In addition to that, 
halocarbons (1.1% of the GHG) have increased from a near-
zero pre-industrial background concentration, primarily due 
to human activities. 
There is very high confidence that the global average net 
effect of human activities since 1750 has been a warming. 
Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures 
since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed 
increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations. The 
observed widespread warming of the atmosphere and ocean, 
together with ice mass loss, support the conclusion that it is 
extremely unlikely that global climate change of the past 50 
years can be explained without external forcing and very 
likely that it is not due to known natural causes alone. During 
this period, the sum of solar and volcanic forcings would 
likely have produced cooling, not warming (Fig. 2). 
                                                          
1 Uncertainty is expressed by a probability of occurrence: virtually certain >99%; 
extremely likely >95%; very likely >90%; likely >66%; more likely than not > 50%; 
about as likely as not 33% to 66%; unlikely <33%; very unlikely <10%; extremely 
unlikely <5%; exceptionally unlikely <1% [8]. 
 
Figure 1.  Atmospheric concentrations of CO2, CH4 and N2O over the last 
10,000 years (large panels) and since 1750 (inset panels). Measurements 
are shown from ice cores (symbols with different colours for different 
studies) and atmospheric samples (red lines). The corresponding radiative 
forcings relative to 1750 are shown on the right hand axes of the large 
panels. [8] 
 
Figure 2.  Comparison of observed continental- and global-scale changes in surface temperature with results simulated by climate models using either 
natural or both natural and anthropogenic forcings. Decadal averages of observations are shown for the period 1906-2005 (black line) plotted against the 
centre of the decade and relative to the corresponding average for the 1901-1950. Lines are dashed where spatial coverage is less than 50%. Blue shaded 
bands show the 5 to 95% range for 19 simulations from five climate models using only the natural forcings due to solar activity and volcanoes. Red shaded 
bands show the 5 to 95% range for 58 simulations from 14 climate models using both natural and anthropogenic forcings. [8] 
III. OBSERVED CHANGES IN CLIMATE 
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now 
evident from observations of increases in global average air 
and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice 
and rising global average sea level. 
Fig. 3 shows the time series of the combined global land 
and marine surface temperature record from 1850 to 2010. 
According to the method of calculation used by the Climate 
Research Unit of the University of East Anglia [15], the year 
2010 was the equal third warmest on record (with 2003), 
exceeded by 1998 and 2005. The years 2003, 2005 and 2010 
are only distinguishable in the third decimal place. The 
period 2001-2010 (0.44°C above 1961-90 mean) was 0.20°C 
warmer than the 1991-2000 decade (0.24°C above 1961-90 
mean). The warmest year of the entire series has been 1998, 
with a temperature of 0.55°C above the 1961-90 mean. After 
1998, the next nine warmest years in the series are all in the 
decade 2001-2010. During this decade, only 2008 is not in 
the ten warmest years. Even though 2008 was the coldest 
year of the 21st century it was still the 12th warmest year of 
the whole record. 
Increases in sea level are consistent with warming. 
Global average sea level rose at an average rate of 1.3 mm/y  
since 1870, then of 1.8 mm/y over 1961 to 2003 and of about 
3.4 mm/y from 1993 to 2008 [8,16]. Since 1993, 
approximately 30% of the rate of sea level rise is due to 
ocean thermal expansion in response to ocean warming. 
Mass loss in mountain glaciers and ice sheets accounts for 
approximately another 55% [16]. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Global air temperature from 1850 to 2010 [15]. 
Observed decreases in snow and ice extent are also 
consistent with warming. Satellite data since 1978 show that 
annual average Arctic sea ice extent has shrunk by 2.7% per 
decade, with larger decreases in summer of 7.4% per decade. 
Mountain glaciers and snow cover on average have declined in 
both hemispheres. The maximum areal extent of seasonally 
frozen ground has decreased by about 7% in the Northern 
Hemisphere since 1900, with decreases in spring of up to 15% 
[8]. 
At continental, regional and ocean basin scales, 
numerous long term changes in other aspects of climate have 
also been observed. Trends from 1900 to 2005 have been 
observed in precipitation amount in many large regions. 
Over this period, precipitation increased significantly in 
eastern parts of North and South America, northern Europe 
and northern and central Asia whereas precipitation declined 
in the Sahel, the Mediterranean, southern Africa and parts of 
southern Asia. Globally, the area affected by drought has 
likely increased since the 1970s [8]. 
Some extreme weather events have changed in frequency 
and/or intensity over the last 50 years. Yet, it is very likely 
that cold days, cold nights and frosts have become less 
frequent over most land areas, while hot days and hot nights 
have become more frequent. It is also likely that heat waves 
have become more frequent over most land areas, that the 
frequency of heavy precipitation events (or proportion of 
total rainfall from heavy falls) has increased over most areas, 
and that the incidence of extreme high sea level has 
increased at a broad range of sites worldwide since 1975 [8]. 
IV. FUTURE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
Since we know that climate change is linked to GHG 
emissions, six scenarios to predict future GHG emissions [8] 
have been created by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) based on population and economic 
growth, types of technologies, energy demand, etc. (Fig. 4): 
• The B1 scenario believes that the world will be more 
integrated and more ecologically friendly. It is 
characterized by: a rapid economic growth but with 
rapid changes towards a service and information 
economy; a population rising to 9 billion in 2050 and 
then declining; reductions in material intensity and 
the introduction of clean and resource efficient 
technologies; and an emphasis on global solutions to 
economic, social and environmental stability. With 
this scenario which is the most optimistic about the 
future behaviour of our societies, best global 
temperature change estimate between 1980-1999 and 
2090-2099 is +1.8°C, with a likely range of +1.1°C 
to 2.9°C. 
• The B2 scenario expects a world more divided but 
more ecologically friendly. It is characterized by a 
continuously increasing population (but at a slower 
rate than in A2); an emphasis on local rather than 
global solutions to economic, environmental and 
social stability; intermediate levels of economic 
development; and a less rapid and more fragmented 
technological change than in A1 and B1. This 
scenario would lead to a temperature change of +2.4 
[1.4 to 3.8]°C between 1980-1999 and 2090-2099. 
• The A1 scenarios bet on a more integrated world and 
is characterized by: a rapid economic growth; a 
global population that reaches 9 billion in 2050 and 
then gradually declines; the quick spread of new and 
efficient technologies; a convergent world income 
and way of life converge between regions; and 
extensive social and cultural interactions worldwide. 
Three sub scenarios can be distinguished based on 
their technological emphasis: A1T with a 
prominence of non-fossil energy sources; A1B with 
a balanced weight of all energy sources; and A1FI 
that would be fossil intensive (the worst case 
scenario). With these scenarios, best global 
temperature change estimate between 1980-1999 and 
2090-2099 are +2.4 [1.4 to 3.8]°C, +2.8 [1.7 to 
4.4]°C, and +4.0 [2.4 to 6.4]°C, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.  Global GHG emissions (in GtCO2-eq per year) in the absence of 
additional climate policies: six illustrative scenarios (coloured lines). The 
emissions include CO2, CH4, N2O and F-gases. See [8] for additional 
details. 
• The A2 scenario imagines a more divided world. It 
is characterized by: a world of independently 
operating, self-reliant nations, a regionally oriented 
economic development, a continuously increasing 
population, a slower and more fragmented 
technological changes and improvements to per 
capita income. With this scenario, best global 
temperature change estimate between 1980-1999 and 
2090-2099 is +3.4 [2.0 to 5.4]°C. 
For the next two decades a warming of about 0.2°C per 
decade is projected for a range of IPCC emissions scenarios. 
Even if the concentrations of all GHGs and aerosols had 
been kept constant at year 2000 levels, a further warming of 
about 0.1°C per decade would be expected. Afterwards, 
temperature projections increasingly depend on specific 
emissions scenarios. Continued GHG emissions at or above 
current rates would cause further warming and induce many 
changes in the global climate system during the 21st century 
that would very likely be larger than those observed during 
the 20th century. 
The latest IPCC report predicts, by the mid- to late 21st 
century, a virtually certain sea-level rise, decrease of cold 
nights and increase in hot days and nights; a very likely 
increase in warm spells, heat waves and heavy precipitation; 
and a likely increase in intense tropical cyclone activity and 
in areas affected by droughts. Without taking into account 
any changes or developments in adaptive capacity, the major 
projected impacts of these changes are [8]: 
• Agriculture, forestry and ecosystems: damage to 
crops; soil erosion, inability to cultivate land due to 
waterlogging of soils; etc. 
• Water resources: adverse effects on quality of 
surface and groundwater; contamination of water 
supply; and water stress; 
• Human health: increased risk of malnutrition, deaths, 
injuries and infectious, respiratory and skin diseases; 
and migration-related health effects; 
• Industry, settlement and society: disruption of 
settlements, commerce, transport and societies due 
to flooding: pressures on urban and rural 
infrastructures; loss of property; and population 
migration [8]. 
As shown on Fig. 5, the impacts of the future climate 
change will broadly depend on its magnitude. Globally, it is 
clear that fast changes on systems and sectors will make 
adaptation policies more difficult to successfully apply. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Examples of impacts associated with global average temperature change. Illustrative examples of global impacts projected for climate and sea 
level changes associated with different amounts of increase in global average surface temperature in the 21st century. The black lines link impacts; broken-
line arrows indicate impacts continuing with increasing temperature. Entries are placed so that the left-hand side of text indicates the approximate level of 
warming that is associated with the onset of a given impact. Adaptation to climate change is not included in these estimations. Confidence levels for all 
statements are high [8]. 
But many uncertainties remain about the impact of the 
future climate. For example, the latest IPCC report projected 
a global sea level rise of 18 to 59 cm from 1990 to the 2090s, 
plus an unspecified amount that could come from changes in 
the large ice sheets covering Greenland and Antarctica [8]. 
But since 1993, sea level has risen about 80 per cent faster, at 
3.4 mm/y, than the average IPCC model projection of 1.9 
mm/y [16]. IPCC’s projections seem therefore obsolete. Yet, 
as presented in Fig. 6, a number of recent studies taking the 
semi-empirical approach have predicted much higher sea 
level rise for the 21st century than the IPCC, exceeding one 




Figure 6.  Estimates for 21st century sea level rise from semi-empirical 
models as compared to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [8]. For exact 
definitions of the time periods and emissions scenarios considered, see 
[17]. 
Such uncertainty on future sea level rise is extremely 
important since its immediate effect is submergence and 
increased flooding of coastal land, as well as saltwater 
intrusion of surface waters. Longer-term effects also occur as 
the coast adjusts to the new conditions, including increased 
erosion and saltwater intrusion into groundwater. Coastal 
wetlands such as saltmarshes and mangroves will also 
decline unless they have a sufficient sediment supply to keep 
pace with sea level rise, which is rarely the case. These 
physical impacts in turn have both direct and indirect 
socioeconomic impacts, which appear to be devastatingly 
negative. These impacts will even be worst in areas already 
affected by subsidence such as the Ganges-Brahmaputra, 
Mekong, and Changjiang deltas [18]. 
Flooding of coastal land and increasing shoreline erosion 
will very likely cause massive population displacements, as 
frequently forecasted as one of the most dramatic possible 
consequences of climate change. Yet, numerous deltas and 
shorelines have been studied in order to assess impact of sea 
level rise on agriculture, economy and people potentially 
affected. Fig. 7 shows the results simulated for the Nile delta 
which supported a population of 40.2 million in 2000. It 
appears that a 50 cm sea level rise would affect (and very 
likely displace) 4 million people and would submerge a land 
area of 1,800 km2 out of which many are agricultural lands 
[20]. A one meter or greater sea level rise would cause 
obviously much larger impacts. Yet, the affected population 
and land would be 6.1, 8.0 and 10.7 million people for a 1, 
1.5 and 2 meters of sea level rise, respectively. Food security 
will also be impacted since thousands of km2 of agricultural 
lands will be submerged [19-20]. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Impact of sea level rise on the Nile delta [19]. 
Migrations as an adaptation strategy of the poor will not 
be restricted to sea level rise impacts but will also be driven 
by several climate modifications and related environmental 
degradation such drought, floods, extreme climate events, 
desertification, etc. In 2008, 20 million persons have been 
displaced by extreme weather events and this figure is very 
likely to increase in the next decades. Most widely cited 
estimates of the so-called climate refugees vary from 200 
million to 1 billion people displaced by 2050 because of 
climate change impacts [21-23]. Three major factors will 
drive these forced migrations in the future: [i] the increase of 
climate deregulation affecting [ii] unprepared poor areas 
with no adaptation strategy to change [iii] in regions 
characterised by an important demographic growth. 
V. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuels are the 
primary cause of global warming. Special attention has been 
focused on the CO2 directly emitted by each country. Top 10 
emitters in 2008 are presented in Table I with comparison 
values for 1971 and 1990. It shows that 29 gigatonnes of 
CO2 from fuel combustion were globally emitted in 2008. 
Between 1971 and 2008, global emissions doubled, with 
industrialized countries dominating historical totals. 
However, the share of developed countries (here represented 
as the member countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development or OECD) progressively 
shrank as developing countries, led by emerging economies 
such as China and India (with respectively +714% and 
+614%), increased at a much faster rate (+260% for non-
OECD countries). Yet, OECD countries show a 37% 
increase during the 1971-2008 period while representing 
69% of global CO2 emissions in 1971, 54% in 1990, and 
‘only’ 47% in 2008. Although such CO2 emissions increase 
in non-OECD countries may seem impressive, it is worth 
mentioning that OECD’s member countries have been 
responsible for more than half of these emissions until 2004 
while their population is less than 18% of the total (Table II). 
TABLE I.  ESTIMATION OF CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION (IN 106 TONS) AND THEIR EVOLUTION AT THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS, 
AND TOP 10 EMITTING COUNTRIES IN 2008 (ACCOUNTING FOR 67% OF THE WORLD’S CO2 EMISSIONS). (INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL MARINE AND AVIATION 
BUNKERS) [24]. 












World 14,096 20,965 29,381 +49 % +40 % +108 % 
OECD 9,602 11,414 13,189 +19 % +16 % +37 % 
Non-OECD 4,494 9,550 16,193 +113 % +70 % +260 % 
1. China 813 2,259 6,619 +178 % +193 % +714 % 
2. United States 4,329 4,999 5,739 +15 % +15 % +33 % 
3. Russian Federation 1,264 2,211 1,611 +75 % -27 % +27 % 
4. India 202 596 1,442 +195 % +142 % +614 % 
5. Japan 813 1,095 1,186 +35 % +8 % +46 % 
6. Germany 1,000 971 835 -3 % -14 % -17 % 
7. Canada 343 438 555 +28 % +27 % +62 % 
8. United Kingdom 644 576 554 -11 % -4 % -14 % 
9. Korea 54 235 541 +335 % +130 % +902 % 
10. Iran 52 183 511 +252 % +179 % +883 % 
 
TABLE II.  OECD AND NON-OECD POPULATIONS (IN MILLION); PART OF THE WORLD CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION (IN %); CO2 EMISSIONS 















CO2 emissions per 
capita - Evolution 
1990-2008 
World 6,688 100.0 100.0 4.0 4.4 +10.3 % 
OECD 1,190 17.8 44.9 10.9 11.1 +1.3 % 
North America 444 6.6 22.9 15.9 15.1 -4.9 % 
Pacific 202 3.0 7.4 8.7 10.8 +24.0 % 
Europe 543 8.1 14.6 8.2 7.9 -3.7 % 
Non-OECD 5,498 82.2 55.1 2.3 2.9 +30.2 % 
Europe 53 0.8 1.0 6.6 5.3 -19.5 % 
North Africa 163 2.4 1.3 1.7 2.3 +39.2 % 
Sub-Saharan Africa  821 12.3 1.9 0.7 0.7 -8.3 % 
Middle East 199 3.0 5.4 4.9 8.0 +62.6 % 
Former Soviet Union 285 4.3 8.3 12.8 8.6 -32.9 % 
Latin America 462 6.9 3.8 1.8 2.4 +36.9 % 
Asia - China 2,183 32.6 10.9 0.8 1.5 +75.2 % 
China 1,333 19.9 22.5 2.0 5.0 +150.8 % 
In 1971, China was the equal fourth CO2 emitter country 
(with Japan), largely exceeded by the United States, the 
Russian Federation and Germany (Table I). At that time, the 
United States (208 million inhabitants) were emitting as 
much CO2 than non-OECD countries (2,877 million 
inhabitants). Recently, things have changed. China took the 
lead in 2007 and India (#11 in 1971) has become the third 
top emitter in 2010, exceeding the Russian Federation. 
This figure, presenting China and India ranking in the top 
3 emitting countries, does not correctly highlight the still 
existing gap between per capita CO2 emissions between 
developed and developing countries (Table II). This makes 
many observers from emerging economies quite 
uncomfortable since many western medias say that China 
and India have to “do something” to reduce global CO2 
emissions [10,25]. As an example, The Independent, a 
serious British newspaper, published on the front page “The 
UK causes two per cent of global carbon emissions. What 
should we do about the remaining 98 per cent?”. [26] 
Yet, detailing ‘per capita’ CO2 emissions would then 
clearly show that these figures are four times higher in 
developed countries (11.1 tons CO2/y) than in developing 
countries (2.9 tons CO2) with an average of 4.4 tons CO2 in 
2008. The United States alone generate close to 20% of the 
global CO2 emissions, despite a population of less than 5% 
of the world total. In the mean time, China, contributing to a 
comparable share of global emissions (23%), accounts for 
20% of the world population. India, with 17% of the world 
population contributes to less than 5% of the CO2 emissions. 
Therefore, the levels of per capita CO2 emissions are very 
diverse. As an example, one American citizen is annually 
responsible of 18.8 tons of CO2 emissions, that is the 
equivalent of near four Chinese, fifteen Indians, or 73 sub-
Saharan Africans issued from least developed countries. 
In addition, such data sets on the carbon footprint of 
nations (Tables I and II) only take into account production-
based inventories. Very few studies include the emissions 
associated with consumption of goods and services in each 
country. Consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions 
differ from currently traditional estimates. 
In China alone, 30% of the growth in CO2 emissions 
between 1990 and 2002 was attributable to the production of 
exports from China that were consumed in other countries, 
and the share of the growth increased to 50% between 2002 
and 2005. In 1990, 16% of Chinese CO2 emissions were 
from the production of exports, increasing to 30% in 2005. 
The major part of the exported products was destined for 
developed countries [27]. 
In 2004, 23% of global CO2 emissions were traded 
internationally, primarily as exports from China and other 
emerging markets to consumers in developed countries. 
These studies generally find that rich countries have a larger 
carbon footprint than their territorial emissions, while the 
opposite holds for poor countries [28] so that, when 
considering consumption-based CO2, developed countries 
are still the major CO2 emitters despite their small population 
(Fig. 8). Yet, in some wealthy countries, including Austria, 
Belgium, France, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom, over 30% of consumption-based emissions were 
imported, with net imports to many Europeans of >4 tons 
CO2 per capita in 2004. Net import of emissions to the 
United States in the same year was somewhat less: 10.8% of 
total consumption-based emissions and 2.4 tons CO2 per 
person. In contrast, 30% of the CO2 emissions produced in 
China in 2005 were exported to consumers elsewhere [28]. 
As an example, one Belgian emitted 13.8 tons CO2 per 
capita in 2008 taking into account production-based 
inventories (including marine and aviation bunkers) [24]. 
Using identical inventories, one Chinese emitted 5.0 tons 
CO2 per capita during the same year [24]. Therefore, one 
may say that one Belgian’s CO2 emissions are equivalent to 
those of 2.8 Chinese. But when considering import and 
export of emissions, it appears that one Chinese exports 1.5 
tons CO2 while one Belgian imports goods (mainly “Made in 
China” [29]) that are equivalent to 5.0 tons CO2 (net flux2) 
[28]. At the end, one Belgian consumed 18.8 tons CO2 while 
one Chinese produced 3.5 tons CO2. As a result, CO2 
emissions of one Belgian are equivalent to those of 5.4 
Chinese. 
 























Figure 8.  Fossil fuel CO2 emissions (GtC per year) since 1990 from 
Annex B countries (mostly advanced economies) and non-Annex B 
countries (mostly developing countries) taking into account production-
based (top) and consumption-based (down) inventories [30]. 
                                                          
2 Belgium imports 8.8 tons CO2 and exports 3.8 tons CO2 per capita [28]. 
The early 2000’s have known an unexpected rapid 
economic growth in a globalizing world. Although a 
relatively quick spread of efficient technologies is on the 
way in developed countries, more and more goods are 
produced “low cost” in emerging economies countries in 
order to feed developed countries. Since fossil fuel CO2 
emissions coming from emerging economies have a high 
carbon intensity and an increasing reliance on coal, global 
CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuels have 
increased at an unpredicted rate [11]. Indeed, Fig. 9 shows 
that fossil fuel CO2 emissions during the past decade have 
been more important than any scenario elaborated from 2000 
onwards. Recent emissions are higher than the worst case 
scenario (A1FI) which is fossil intensive and which would 
lead to a best global temperature change estimate between 
1980-1999 and 2090-2099 of +4.0 [2.4 to 6.4]°C. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Fossil fuel CO2 emissions (GtC per year) since 1990 compared 
with the six IPCC scenarios [30]. 
VI. WHAT DO WE DO TO FIGHT AGAINST CLIMATE 
CHANGE? 
Responding to climate change involves a global risk 
management process that includes both mitigation (GHG 
emissions reduction can reduce the exposure to climate 
change) and adaptation capacity that can reduce sensitivity to 
climate change. In recent years, the understanding about the 
relationship between impacts and vulnerability has 
improved. 
Vulnerability and damage implied will depend on 
exposure (the rate and magnitude of climate change, Fig. 5), 
sensitivity, which is determined in part and where relevant 
by development status, and adaptive capacity. 
It is now clearly understood that neither adaptation nor 
mitigation alone can avoid climate change impacts. 
Adaptation is necessary both in the short term and longer 
term to address impacts resulting from the warming that 
would occur even for the lowest stabilisation scenarios 
assessed, especially when recent trends show that we 
currently are above the worst case scenario in terms of 
emissions (Fig. 9). Adaptation and mitigation can 
complement each other and together can significantly reduce 
the risks of climate change. 
In order to stabilise the concentration of GHGs in the 
atmosphere, emissions would need to peak and decline 
thereafter. The lower the stabilisation level, the more quickly 
this peak and decline would need to occur. Mitigation efforts 
over the next two to three decades will have a large impact 
on opportunities to achieve lower stabilisation levels. 
In the best case scenario for global mitigation strategy, 
atmospheric CO2 concentration (390 ppm in 2010) should be 
stabilised in between 350 and 400 ppm [8,12]. The peaking 
year for global CO2 emissions should be between 2000 and 
2015, together with a reduction in global CO2 emissions 
ranging from -50% to -85% in 2050 compared to 2000. This 
would prevent most areas from dramatic adverse effects of 
climate change. Although recent trends in global CO2 
emissions show that this scenario is now almost impossible 
to meet, developing countries claim it and it became a key 
issue in climate negotiations. 
A. Mitigation: The current and post-Kyoto Protocol 
The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to achieve 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a 
level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to 
ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
Although the UNFCCC does not set mandatory limits on 
GHG emissions for individual countries and contains no 
enforcement mechanisms, it provided the Kyoto Protocol 
that sets mandatory emission limits. It was initially adopted 
on 11 December 1997, signed by 192 countries, and entered 
into force on 16 February 2005. All developed countries 
(Annex I Parties) signed the Kyoto Protocol with the 
objective to reduce their GHG by -5.2% between 1990 and 
2008-2012 but the United States did not ratify it while their 
reduction target was initially -7.0%. 
Over the period 1990-2008, total aggregate GHG 
emissions excluding emissions/removals from land use, land-
use change and forestry (LULUCF) for all Annex I Parties 
decreased by 6.1%, and total GHG emissions/removals 
including LULUCF decreased by 10.4%. For Annex I Parties 
with economies in transition (Annex I EIT Parties), GHG 
emissions excluding and including LULUCF decreased by 
36.8% and 48.5%, respectively. For Annex I non-EIT 
Parties, GHG emissions excluding LULUCF increased by 
7.9% cent and GHG emissions including LULUCF increased 
by 8.3% [31]. Note that GHG emissions for international 
aviation and for international marine transportation increased 
by 74.8% and by 19.5% over the period 1990-2008, and are 
not taken into account by the Kyoto Protocol. 
So that, if the Kyoto Protocol GHG emissions reduction 
target will certainly be met by Annex I Parties during the 
2008-2012 period, it will be due to the large decrease 
observed in economies in transition, to the global financial 
and economic crisis that started in 2008, and to the 
unanticipated augmentation of energy, especially oil. 
If the European Union (EU) already met its Kyoto 
Protocol GHG emissions reduction commitment and that 
Japan will probably meet it, other developed countries will 
definitely not. Yet, between 1990 and 2008, the United 
States increased their GHG emissions by 15.3% (including 
LULUCF) while their target (that was not ratified) by 2008-
2012 is -7.0%. Canada, Australia and New-Zealand present 
even more important increases, by over 30%, very far from 
their Kyoto Protocol commitments (Table III). 
As an example, with a GHG emissions (including 
LULUCF) increase of 62.4% between 1990 and 2008, New 
Zealand will not respect its obligation under the Kyoto 
Protocol to maintain its 2008-2012 emissions to 1990 levels. 
In addition to that, the country proposed a GHG reduction 
objective of -20% by 2020 (in the case of a global 
agreement) before the Copenhagen Conference, cutting by 
half its emissions in 12 years: an impossible target when 
considering previous and future energy scenarios, even 
without including consumption-based emissions. The 
position of Canada is not better. While its obligation under 
the Kyoto Protocol is to cut its GHG emissions by 6% to 
1990 levels on average over the 2008-2012 commitment 
period, those have increased by 33.6%. Their proposed 
reduction objective is -20% compared to … 2006, that is a 
24% increase between 1990 and 2020: a very unpleasant 
objective for an industrialized developed country with 
respect to developing countries expectancies! 
In 2009, before the COP 15 of the UNFCCC which was 
held in Copenhagen, developed countries proposed their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives 
(QELRO) for the post-Kyoto phase (1990-2020). These 
proposals were not those expected by developing countries. 
Yet, reduction objectives of developing countries were 
ranging from +24% for Canada to -30% for the EU (in the 
case of a global agreement), while the United States (second 
world’s major GHG emitter) proposed a reduction objective 
of -3% (Table III). 
Lately, the second 2011 meeting of the Parties held to the 
forthcoming COP 17 of the UNFCCC in Durban, which was 
held in Bonn (6-19 June) ended without major decisions on 
the shape of a follow-up to the post-Kyoto commitments. 
The debate regarding the possibility of a second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol was inconclusive since the 
positions of the different negotiating groups were as distant 
as ever. With Russia, the United States, Canada and Japan all 
rejected an extension of the Protocol, as wished by 
developing countries. The heat was on the EU, whose 
commitment regarding climate change (-20% to -30% 
between 1990 and 2020) has turned it into a key player in the 
post-2012 debate. The pressure from developing countries to 
the EU to unilaterally sign a second commitment period to 
the Kyoto Protocol was met with resistance by the EU 
Climate Commissioner, who commented that, despite its 
efforts, the EU represents a minor share of global GHG 
emissions and that other major emitters should be pressured 
and involved in climate negotiations. In fact, at the end of the 
Bonn meeting, even the EU confirmed that such possibility 
is not feasible unless all major emitting countries commit to 
binding reduction targets. 
In se, the EU is not wrong since its share of global 
production-based CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil 
fuels was ‘only’ 13.5% in 2008, exceeded by China (22.5%) 
and the United States (19.5%) [24], but such declarations are 
very symptomatic of the current state of the negotiations: “If 
you move, I will follow. If you do not…” In the same time, it 
is true that efforts made from 1990 to 2008 by the EU to 
meet its Kyoto Protocol CO2 emissions reduction 
commitment represented less than 3 months of Chinese CO2 
increase in 2007 [24]. 
But for the G77, a coalition of 131 developing countries 
currently led by Argentina, the “common but differentiated 
responsibility”, one of the key principles of the UNFCCC, is 
not respected. 
TABLE III.  OFFICIAL GHG EMISSIONS* EVOLUTION FROM 1990 TO 2008 IN SOME SELECTED DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WITH 
AND WITHOUT LAND-USE, LAND-USE CHANGE AND FORESTRY (LULUCF); THEIR GHG EMISSIONS REDUCTION COMMITMENT 
WITHIN THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THEIR QUANTIFIED EMISSION LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OBJECTIVES (QELRO) BEFORE 
THE COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE AND SINCE [31-32]. 
Countries GHG evolution 
without LULUCF 
(1990-2008) 





Proposed QELRO for 2020 before the 
Copenhagen Conference (2009) and since† 
Europe** -11.3% -13.3% -8.0% -20% to -30% compared to 1990 levels 
USA +13.3% +15.3% -7.0% 
(but not ratified) 
-15% compared to 2005, that is 
-3% compared to 1990 
None (June 2011) † 
Japan +1.0% -0.2% -6.0% -15% compared to 2005, that is 
-25% compared to 1990 
None (June 2011) † 
Canada +24.1% +33.6% -6.0% -20% compared to 2006, that is 
+24% compared to 1990 
None (June 2011) † 
Australia** +31.4% +33.1% +8.0% -5% to -25% compared to 2000, that is 
-3% to -24% compared to 1990 
New Zealand** +22.7% +62.4% 0.0% -10% to -20% compared to 1990 
* Considering all GHG (CO2, CH4, NO2, HFCs, PFCs and SF6). All data expressed in CO2 equivalent (CO2 eq). http://unfccc.int/ 
** For Europe, Australia and New Zealand, the lowest QELRO is unconditional while the highest one corresponds to a special objective in the case of a global agreement. 
Yet, Article 3 of the UNFCCC states: “The Parties 
should protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity 
and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof”. Indeed, it is 
recognized that developed countries are principally 
responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions in 
the atmosphere as a result of more than 120 years of 
industrial activity [33]. 
In 2008, the United States and the EU concentrated 12% 
of the world population and 32% of the global production-
based CO2 emissions from fossil fuels use, but their 
cumulative CO2 emissions were representing 50% and 37% 
of the global CO2 emissions since 1890 and 1990, 
respectively. In the same time, Chinese and Indians represent 
37% of the world population and their cumulative CO2 
emissions were much lower: 12% since 1890 and 19% since 
1990, compared to the current 27% [24,34]. The historical 
CO2 emissions debt is therefore huge. This so-called ‘climate 
justice’ is another reason for developing countries to ask for 
large cuts in GHG emissions from developed countries. 
One thing is now clear for climate negotiators of 
developing countries and other observers: global mitigation 
strategies will certainly not be sufficient to stabilise 
atmospheric CO2 concentration in between 350 and 400 ppm 
by 2015, and industrialized developed countries have to take 
the lead in addressing the climate problem by drastically 
reducing GHG emissions while excluding developing 
countries from binding GHG emissions reductions.  
B. Adaptation: Will we make it? 
As mentioned above, developing countries are least 
responsible for causing climate change but are very likely to 
face disproportionate impacts in terms of natural disasters, 
agriculture, health effects and food security since already 
existing stresses on health, well-being, limited financial, 
institutional and human resources leave the poor most 
vulnerable and least able to adapt to the impacts of negative 
rapid changes, including climate change. Consequently, 
climate change may undermine the ability of developing 
countries, particularly least developed countries, to meet 
some targets of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), thereby slowing progress towards sustainable 
development. Yet, climate change poses a particular threat to 
those marginalized from development and global adaptation 
cost estimates for developing countries are extremely 
important as shown in Table IV.  
TABLE IV.  ESTIMATES OF ADAPTATION COSTS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES FOR 2010-2015 [35] 
Source US$ billion per year 
World Bank (2006) 9-41 
Stern (2006) 4-37 
Oxfam (2007) >50 
UNDP (2007) 86-109 
UNFCCC (2007) 27-66 
According to different studies, adaptation costs estimates 
in developing countries range in between 4 and 109 billion 
US$ per year for the 2010-2015 period [35].  
At the COP 15 of the UNFCCC (the Copenhagen climate 
conference), developed countries agreed on an international 
aid package worth hundreds of billions of US$ for adaptation 
to threats linked to climate change prioritized for the most 
vulnerable countries, such as least developed countries, small 
islands developing States and Africa. The so-called fast-start 
fund worth US$ 10 billion annually would operate from 
2010 until 2012. For long-term finance, developed countries 
agreed to support a goal of jointly mobilizing US$ 100 
billion a year by 2020 to address the adaptation needs of 
developing countries. 
A first key problem is that the amounts are much lower 
than many experts say is necessary to help poor countries 
adapt to climate change and develop cleaner technologies 
(Table IV). Another problem is that the Copenhagen Accord 
did not specify who would pay or how the money would be 
raised, at a time when most rich-world governments face 
unprecedented pressures to shore up their own budgets and 
find ways of supporting their own industries in the wake of 
agonizing debt and banking crises. In addition, while the 
Copenhagen Accord specifies that financing must be new 
and additional, it appeared than some donors have simply 
renamed existing aid budgets or counted previous pledges of 
climate finance [36]. 
So far, as of August 2011, the UNFCCC has recorded 
commitments for the fast-start funds of about US$ 5.9 
billion, far short of the US$ 30 billion goal. But only 14 
countries have already participated in that project, with one 
important missing country (Japan) who has promised half the 
total of the fast-start funds (US$ 15 billion) but who 
dramatically suffered from the recent devastating tsunami in 
addition to the global financial crisis [37]. 
Those difficulties, and others, over fast-start financing 
suggest that wealthy nations will face even more obstacles 
delivering on the larger promise of US$ 100 billion annually 
in new aid by 2020. 
Recent actuality such as the current famine affecting 12 
million people in East Africa shows that raising money for 
major emergency humanitarian aid is not an easy task while 
the problem of rainfall shortages and starvation is far from 
being new and surprising in this region of the world. 
In addition, there is a large body of evidence that, even 
without climate change effects, the vulnerability of natural 
and human systems is extremely high, especially due to the 
mismanagement of natural resources, the lack of land use 
planning and the nonexistence of policies focused on natural 
hazard management. 
The future of adaptation strategies to climate change 
seems therefore gloomy. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Despite improving scientific understanding of climate 
change and a remarkable rise in public awareness of the 
importance of environmental issues, a shift in the political 
process is still awaited. Yet, no change is expected if all 
current and historical major emitters do not negotiate and 
make mitigation efforts. 
This situation is the same for corporate policies. As an 
example, Albert Frère, an important European businessman 
said: “We have to be reasonable in a globalized economy 
and not react too massively [about GHG emissions 
reduction] unless you offer such advantages to emerging 
competitors who do not respect the same ecologic standards 
that they could destroy our companies, in particular those 
who did strong ecological choices. This would be the worst 
thing to do in Europe. Yet, we have to act but only within the 
sound of our own economic survival.”3 
In recent years, major changes in developed countries are 
seen in the development of more efficient technologies and 
the merchandising surrounding these progresses, such as the 
sudden apparition of the so-called greenwashing techniques 
used in advertising that suggest that all new products are 
‘green’, ‘good for the planet’, ecologically friendly and 
beneficial to the environment (e.g. Fig. 10). 
 
 
Figure 10.  “Changing the world without changing the planet”. Typical 
‘greenwasing’ advertising. 
In the meantime, developing countries are very likely to 
face disproportionate impacts in terms of natural disasters, 
                                                          
3 « Ce n’est pas à vous que je dois rappeler qu’il faut savoir respecter la raison dans 
une économie mondialisée et ne pas réagir trop massivement sous peine de donner à 
des compétiteurs émergents qui ne respecteraient pas les mêmes objectifs écologiques 
des avantages tels qu’ils pourraient réduire à néant nos entreprises et, en particulier, 
précisément celles ayant fait des choix écologiques déterminés. Ce serait en effet la 
dernière chose à faire en Europe. Au risque de me répéter, il faut agir mais dans les 
limites respectueuses de notre propre survie économique. » [38] 
agriculture, health effects and food security while they are 
least responsible for causing climate change. It is not sure 
whether they will be able to adapt to such changes since it 
has been shown that even developed countries are not 
prepared for abrupt and extreme climate change [39]. 
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